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Behind, the Road is Blocked:
Art Education and Nostalgia

Paul Duncum
Abstract
Proponents of high culture have trusted its power as an
antidote to contemporary social ills. However, art eduCiiton
should be aware that the history of such attempts is a history of
failure . It is a history of gradual marginalisation, both of the
Cfitiqueand the critics,and of increasingly conservative political
reaction. The critique represents, today as it has always done, a
nostalgia for an idealized past. But the failure of the critique
suggests that there can be no going back. It is argued that the
increasing failure of this critique to positively influence social
and cultural life is a warning that the future of art education lies
elsewhere. As representative of this critique, this p<lperdiscus.ses
the English cultural critics Edmund Burke, Matthew Arnold, F.
R. Leavis and T. S. Eliot; the Frankfurt School Marxists
Horkheimer. Adorno, and Marcuse; and the Postmodern French
critic Jean Baudrillard . Finally, guidelines fo r a future .
contemporary art education are advanced .
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Behind, the Road is Blocked: Art Education
and Nostalgia
From the Picture-Study Movement o f the 19205 10 the
proponents of DBAE with a neo-conservalive a~nda (Greer
(19~), arl educators have attempted to offer high culture as an
antidote to contemporary social life l • Such efforts include, for
example, Kauffman' s (1966) defence of fine art against popular
art and Smith's (1986) promotion of the humanist ideal of artistic
excellence. These proposals share a long and impressive history
which includes many fi ne and courageous minds. But I will
argue that t~e history of the intellectual forerunners of a high
culture version of DBAE and associated proposals offer no hope
for the future of art education. It is a history of fail ure, .Ind it
should act .IS a warning to seek the future of art education
elsewhere.
I am referring to the tradition of high culture critiosm
which, as traced by Williams (1958) and Johnson (1979), involves
olfe~ng high culture IS a remedy to the ugliness of the physiul
environment as well as to the atomizatio n, alienation
stal'ldardiUotioft,and brutality which is said to havecharacteriud
SOda l Ufe for the pasl 2C!O rears. The ~Igh culture SOdal critique
has long been a detenrurung fa ctor 1ft the climate in which art
education has been theorised and practiced. Pearson (1994)
writes .that high culture forms the underlying paroildigm for art
education.
I will concentrate on the original proponoilnts of highcu.lture
rather than examples of the derivitive form it takes in art theory
~nd art eduction The intellectuiill bankruptcy and social
Iff'tleva~ce Of th~ critique is made especially cle.u in this way,
and the Imphcahons for art educoiltion that much more stark.
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Thr: High Culture Critique
The notion of high cultu re began as part of wide ud
general m ovements in thought and feeling, as a response and
contribution to pressures associated with the Industrioill
Revolutio n . Principally, these involved m echanization,
urbaniulion (Bigsby. 1975, p . 6). the development of class
consciousness, and agi tati on o n behalf of d e moc ratic
representa.tion (Williams, 1958, p. xviii). II was part of the
separation of certain moral and intellectual activities from the
impetus of a new, Identifiably Modern society. The word s
indwstry and art had previously referred to human attributes
now came to signify specialised, and opposed institutions.
Induslry. which had once meant sustained application came to
mean manufactUring and productive institutions. And art, which
had once denoted skill. came to mean a particular group of skills
concerned with the imagination and creativity. Aesfhttic. had
once denoted sense activity in general, the dulling and lulling
included, but came to refer to the fine and beautiful, and, by
association, to art (Williams, 1983). CwHurt, previously a word
signi fyi ng a process of human training,. became an abstraction,
a thing in itself (Willia ms. 1983). At the same time, democracy
and class emerged from Specialised use to focus attention on
major realities of social life. Ind ustry, class, and democracy
came to describe the external lerms of modern life: while culture,
by contrast, referred in terms of opposi tio n to an area of personal
experience, as did the new conceptions of aft and the aesthetic .
In its continuing invocation by ilrt educators. the same
dyn.lmics oiI.re d iscernible. Thereappears to be the same desire to
create a calm space within an alleged impersonal and superfici.ll
sod.lllife for the contemplation of aesthetic objects and human
ingenuit y. It is easy to translate the ea rlier opposition to
democratic impulses to read the current suppression of other
culturoil.1voices. It isequally easy to translate for the ugliness and
dehumaniution of industry. the current impersonalization of
high technology, social fragme ntation, and informationoverlOoild .
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The History of High Culture Criticism
In the historical development of the concept of high culture
and i~ continuing relations with the above social dynamics,
three Interrelated themes emerge. Each offers a wolrning to
proponents of oIn art education bued on high culture. The
themes are: the groldua' margiNlisation of high culture social
analysis; the gnduoll margiNlisation of high culture critics
from centres of power and innuence; and the reactiona.ry, antidemocra.tic political positions adopted by both socially
progressIVe and conservative critics. These themes will be
highlighted below by examining the tradition of English literary
critics, in particular Edmund Burke, Matthew Arnold, F.R. Lenis
and T.s Eliot. Alsoconsidered are the Frank.furt School Marxists
Marcuse, Horkheirner and Adorno. Finally, the French
postmodern critic Jean Baudrillard will be e:urnined . These
critics are rarely identified in art education literature although
Ralph Smith (1992) refers to himself as "an Arnoldian, pure and
simple" (p. 72) but their contributions to the history of the high
culture critique are seminal. They have been chosen as
representative because each has made a substantive contribution
to the history of the critique. While very different in orientation,
each shares major ch.aracteristics of the high culture social
crit~que: a distain for their own cultural period, contempt for
ordmary people, and a regressiveand pessimistic view of histo ry
characterised by nostalgia for the pa.st2.
The critique characteristically views contemporary times
as a muked decline from previous high standards and a more
integrated and personally satisfying society in which these
standards are alleged to have nourished. Thepoint of loss varies
considerably. For the German Neo-Marxists Horkheirner &I:
Adorno (1972/ 1944), it was pre-Fascist Europe, for Marcuse
(1964) it was a pre-technological 19th century, for T. S. Eliot
(1948) it was the old American South. Often it is aSsociated with
the 18th century, although for 18th century writers like Edmund
Burke it had already pa.ssed (Williams, 1958, p . 259-260). Alwilys,
conditions conducive to high culture have been eroded (p. 259).
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Since the ideals of this critique belong to previous periods,
the critique is nostalgic for the past and melancholic about the
present. In this, the espousal of high culture has impressive
precedence. In cJilssical times, nostalgic melancholia was
associated with intellectual life, and in the 17th centurynostalgia
was regarded as a moral virtue of the intelligent person who, in
response to the hOlTors of the world, withd.rew into melancholic
despondency (Stauth &: Turner, 1988). Reflecting this view,
Nietzsche saw intellectual life as "'a restful response to the
everyday world of taste, emotion, feeling ilnd reciprocity'" (po
519). For Nietzsche intellectual life was motivated not only by a
desire todiS<!riminate, but resentment towards the masses. And,
as described below, as the golden age of the high culture critics
diminishes farther and futher and present conditions
increasingly worsen, melancholia deepens, resentment increases,
withdrawal accelerates, and hope diminishes until, with
Biludrillud, there is nothing but disgust, despair, and apathy.
In diagnOSing our own times, Baudrillolfd (1988) unwittingly
says much about his own critique: "'When the real Is no longer
what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is
a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality" (p. 171).

The English Literuy Critics
In England, these general developments can be illustrated
with reference to just four of its most prominent critics. As
Williams (1958) shows, Burke was among the first of the English
literary critics to offer the critique (p. 3). Writing in the late 18th
century when only the first signs of industrialisation and
democratic agitation were appuent, his critique was offered in
termsof iln older England, though one still within living memory,
ilnd the temper of his comments is affirmative (p. 11). Burke was
a political conservative, and his espousal of refined sensibility
was part of his condemnation of both the call for democracy and
the progress of the industrial revolution; his critique involved
an attack. on individualism and advocacy of the benefits of
political gradualism and social constraint. A true believer in the
original Enlightenment project, his goal was human perfectibility
(Williams, 1958, pp. 3-12). Such is his confidence that he identifies
the upholders of traditional standards with the existing state,
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albeit somewhat idealized (pp. 120-123). No such confidence is
shared by his predecessors.
What for Burke were misgivings about the potential of
industrialisation and agitation on behalf of democratic
representation were, fo r Arnold, developing but already
pervasive social realities. Arnold' s tone is consequently
a]together more defensive, at times unworthy of his own ideals
(pp. 116-117). Writing in 1869, he frequently adopts a priggish
even malicious tone. And although his vision is grand, liberal
and optimistic about the possibilities for social change, it is
linked to a reactionary view of the need lor political repression.
For Arnold, culture was foremost a meansof controlling growing
social unrest among the working class through ideological
incorporation Oohnson, 1979, p . 26). 115 purpose was to subvert
dissent, as religion had d one previously (Thompson. 1963). By
entwining ilself with the deepest rools of humanity, culture was
to become the new religion (Eagleton, 1983, pp. 23-24). Arnold
envisaged withholdingdemoaatic rights from those who sought
such righls until they were brought inlo a basic ideological
accord with those currently in power.
In Clillwrt IIn4 Am:m:hy (1869/1891) Arnold argued that
culture represents "the great hope out of our present difficulties"
(p . viii), a way "to safety" (p. 157). He advocated culture as a
defence against the rampant, anarchistic individualism of both
the middle class and wo rking class (p. 10). As well, culture was
conceived as.a buttress against "outbursts of rowdyism" (p . 38)
from the working class in their pursuit of democratic rights. The
tille of his texl focuses his position, contrasting the goal of
colledive perfection with Individualism and mob rule. Culture
is offered as the solution to the social fragmentation, banal
standards, and mech.i.nical w.J.Ys of thinking S.J.id to follow from
industrialisation and the decline of religion. Itisalso the solution
to the dangers inherent in what he fears is a person' s "right to do
what he likes; his right to march where he likes, threaten as he
likes. smash as he likes" (p.37).
There could be no question of identifying the existing state
with the custodians of culture. H is ideal state was to be comprised
of a "remnant'", of "aliens'", who had escaped the habits of class
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prejudice. He seems to have believed that such a state WAS
achievable, and he placed great store in education as a means of
achieving social rec:onstruction Uohnson, 1979. pp. ).4·38).
Like Burke there is no doubting the breadth of Arnold's
vision. Culture involved "a harmonious expansion of huma~
nature" {Arnold, 1869/1891. p . IO) through thesludyand PUrsUit
of perfection. A1though the direction of the Enlightenm~t pro~
had become I"s direct than it was for Burke. Arnold is Its herOIC
champion. He exhorted his contemporaries to study and pursue
hu.rnan perfection
by getting to know on all matters which most concern
us the best which has been thought and said in the
world • .and through this knowledge turning a stream
of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and
habits. (p. viii)
He sought (ultu.r e "through reading, observing. and
thinking'" (p . 49) with "a passion for pure knowledge, but also
the moral and social passion for doing good'" (p . 6).
His was an altogether grand view, but in dealing with the
present and immediate future Arnold did . not escape the
prejudices of his own class. H~advocated equal.lty, and although
his attitude tow.ard the working class was ambivalent (p. 25), he
feared them deeply. Democracy. he argued should be gained
only "by the due course of the law" (p. 161). Ev~n while
acknowledging the plaUSibly good cause of the working class,
he felt able to write that
monster processions in the streets and forcible
irruptions into the parks ... ought to be unninchingly
forbidden and repressed. (p. 158)
Leavi.s· vision is altogether more restricted than Arnold's.
Writing from the early 19305 into the 19705, he was by com~~50.n
backward looking, deeply embattled. and largely pessimistic
about the future . For Leavis, the Enlightenment project had
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become highly problem.atic. The temper of his writing w.as th.at
of.a pseudo-.aristocr.atic .authorit.ari.an (Willi.ams, 1958, p . 25n.
Over the yeus,.as industri.alis.ation and democracy where felt to
thre.aten his position even furthe r, his work wu "maned
increasing' y by a sense o f frustration and d esper.alion" (johnson,
1979, p . 93). He condemned contempor.ary society without
qualific.ation, .a position which offered no me.ans of soci.al
eng.agement (Eagleton, 1983, p . 43).
In Majority Ciuifiullio" nil Mi"orily Csdtw,e (1930) Leavis
reduced the notion of cultu.re from .a gener.. ' sensibility to
speeific works. While his cultural min ority was charged to p rofit
by work expressing the finest consciousness of the age (p . 4), the
emphuis was placed o n the responSibility "to keep .. live the
subtlest and most perishable parts of tr.adition" (p. 5). Leavis
believed that the " plight of culture .... (wasl much more
desperate'" in his own time than in Arnold's, comparing the
environment in which Arnold had worked as "uncongenial"
with his own as "'hostile" (pp. 3, 25). F.. ced with powerful
institutions produc ing the modern press, advertising,
broadcasting, films and consumer dur .. bles (pp. 6-10, 20, 24), he
s.aw culture on a "downward .. cceleralion", in "a crisis" and "cut
off unever before from the powers that rule the wOrld" (pp 31,
5,25).
Animating Le.avis' critique is a contrast between a sm.all
minority culture .and .. society where industrialisation .and
democ ra cy were equally triumphant . Mass society was
standardized, Americanized, and characterized by a gener.al
"levelling d own" of st.andards and the "deliberate exploitation
of the cheap response" (l.eilvis, 1930, pp.8, 11 ).
In consequence, l.eavis is unable to conceive of anything so
splendid ly speculative u a classless rem nant. His cultural
minority is an educated elite concerned with acquiring tu te
(Leavis, 1930, pp . 4-5, 11 -25). And instead of looking to a fu lure
id eal state, Le.avis fights a rearguard aClion, seeing no re.al signs
for iI better future (pp. 31·32).
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His later work Involves a fierce hostility to populu
educ.ation and implac.. ble antipathy to the "transistor ... and
student participation in higher eduCilltion" (Eagleton, 1983, p .
43). While Arnold admitted no distinction between culture and
democracy, Leavis· first allegiance was to culture.
Eliot's allegiance to high cultu.re is even more specific than
Leavis' and his tone is even more sour, ilt times "dogmatic to the
point of insolence" (Williams. 1958, p . 232). Eliot's(1948) critique
is anogantly elitist for his primary concerns are to protect elite
culture from "d eterioration in the upper levels'" (p. 6) and to
reestablish an authoritative, guiding role for the intellectual
cultural producer in society (johnson, 1979, p . 129). Adopting an
essentially feudal vision of society, he sought to legitimate the
cultural dominance of ..n older ruling class Oohnson. 1979, pp.
125-129). In essence, his critique was an authorit.. rian, right
wing, fimtastical mythology which was utterly unrelated to
social realities (E"gleton, 1983, pp. 39, 41). Eliot (1948) believed
that it is an essential cond ition of the p reservation of the quality
of the culture of the minority, that is should remain to be a
minority culture. (p. 107)
As a class based society was "natural" (p. 20), high culture
and egalitarianism were necessarily opposed (p . 16) .
Consequentl y. he envisaged a cultural elite which was to be
attached to, and interactive with, the dominan t social class (p .
42) in an organically functioning, hierarchically ordered society.
He proposed.
a form of society in which an arislocncy would have
a peculiar and essential function, as peculiilll and
essential as the function of any other part ... in which
there be, from " lop · to "'bottom" , a continuous
gradation of cultural levels. (p . 48)
The upper levels would not possess m ore culture thiln
lower levels, but rather would represent a more conscious and
specialised. culture (p . 48). The elite was to be composed, like
other social and culturalleveis, of "groups of filmilies persisting
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from generation to generation each in the same way o f life" and
settled in the ,..me geographic Io<:ality (p. 52). The different
levels were not to be shared, but would nourish the others (pp.
35, 37), just as different regionill cultures were to "'enrich
neighbouring areas" (p. S4). The overall organizing principle
was to be "unity and diversity" (chap. 3), with just suffident
"friction'" to ensure "'c:reativeness and progress'" (pp. 58-59).
Each class, cultural level and geographic area were to funct ion
for the benefit of the whole.
In short, a feudal aristocracy was once again to be
responsible for the moral and social welfare of its people
(Johnson, 1979, p . 125). Eliot stridently opposed me.ritocracy
and uniformeducation (1948, pp,36, 101 l and focused his critique
against a welfare state, the mass media, and working class
institutions and ideas. And whereas Leavis and Arnold held
liberal sympathies towards what they regarded as the social
oppression and cultural devastation of ordinary people
(Swingewood, 1977, p. 10), Eliot, despite o<:casionaJ references
to exploitation and usury (1948, pp . 65, 104), conveyed a distinct
lack o f concern for anyone other than those on top of his sodal
and cultural hierarchy (Johnson, 1979, p . 126).
Thus can be seen from these four examples, which span
nearly two centuries, a growing sense of despair, brave, albeit
narrow visions, which finally dissipated into filntasy . Thecritique
follows this road: from the enlighte.nment of the many to the
enlightenment of the few, to an apartheid of the enlightened few
from the many.
The Frankfurt School Marxists
The most d eveloped Marxist onslaught on contemporary
life from a high cultural perspective is that o f the Frankfurt
School (Laing, 1978, p. 106). Like the.i r English counterparts
discussed above, their influence on social critidsm has been
profound . As Neo-Mar:dsts these critics too were heirs of the
Enlightenment project. but writing during the middle of the
20th century they, like Leavis and Elio t, knew it to be highly
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problematic and li~ited . The~ atta~ked technol0s.tcal p~gre~s,
holding it responSible for ahenation and one dlmenslonailty
(Marcuse, 1964). Traditional transmitters of cultures, particularly
the family, were thought to have been weakened (Swingewood,
1977, p. 14), and, lamentably, the moral organisational strength
of the working class was thought to have d issipated (Laing.
1978, pp. 106-107).
For Horkheimer and Adorno (t944/19n), this critique is
an integral part of their attempt to reconcile the contradiction
that while according to Marxist orthodoxy the timetable for the
collapse of capitalism was well nigh, the European proletariat of
the 1930'5 was further than ever from a revolutionary
consciousness. In liberal, capitalist demo<:racies the fire for
socialism had waned, while elsewhere it had been subvertl!'d
altogether by Fascism. Atomized and amorphOUS, the working
class had proven easy prey to irrational persuasion. Indeed,
fasci s m seemed to derive its support from below, from within
the masses.
Horkheimer and Adorno generalised from German Fascism
to capitalist, liberal democracies as a whole, arguing that what
the fascist s tilte d id through force, though in collaboration with
the masses, the capitalist did through the "'culture industry"
(Swingewood. 1977, pp. 12-18). They regardl!'d the media as a
major weapon in the struggle to conceal the contradictions
iMeTent in capitalism and to legitimate the capitalist' s dominant
power. The media achieved ideologica.1 incorporation by
supplyi ng an unrelieved diet of anaesthetizing, distracting and
falsifying fare from which all oppositional ideas were excluded .
The media was considered imposed from ilbove, although the
masses were seen ilS willing dupes (Swingewood, 19n, p, 13) In
the sadomasochism with which the media held their audiences
(Laing, 1978, pp. 9, 101).
Donald Duck in the cartoons and the unfortunate in
real life get their thrashing so that the audience can
learn to take their own punishment. (Horkheimer ok
Adorno, 1944 /19n, p . 112)
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The only realm in whi(h opposition was thought to still
exist was among the arti s ti( avant-garde and those who
maintain~ an unconlil minated, traditional cu !ture. Cui ture was
viewed 115
a protected realm in which ... tabooed truths could
survive in abstract integrity remote from the society
which suppressed them. (Marcuse, 1964, p . 64)
Thus, for the Frankfurt School, like their 20th century
English Iiteruy counterparts, the guardians of high culture
were a small and embattled minority. Both the Frankfort School
and the English literary critics were nostalgic {or past times and
pessimistic about the future .

Baudrill.J.rd
All previously discussed critics were indebted to the
Enlightenment projec t, however inc reasingly limited they
comidered it, and following this each explicitly assumed a
distinction between high and popular culture. Baudrillard does
neither, and ostensibly his position is the antithesis of high
culture criticism because he claims to reject completely any
remnant of the Enlightenment project and with it any socially
redemptive role for the high uts (Harvey, 19891.
However in several wa ys he is the heir of the high cul ture
tradition. He uncompromisingly denig rates the "masses" and
develops an historical narutive whereby present conditions
have displaced periods of greater certainty and hope.
Throughout, Baudrillard's tone is that of the most profound
repulsion. In these several ways a regreSSive view of history,
condemnolltion of o rdinary people, .tond a repulsed tone his
cri ticism of contemporary social life c.ton be seen to stollnd at the
end of the same tradition as discussed above.
Unlike Eliot and Marcuse, however, who sought to erect
w.tol1s to help preserve their precious high culture from
containinolliion, Baud rillard is forced by the realityof his cultural
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period - in common with most postmodern theorizing (Huvey,
19891- to aCknowledge tNot the w.tolJs have tumbled down .tond
that distinc tions between high and low culture no longer m.toke
sense. There is no longer a high culture to which one can seek to
return.
Whereu Eliot was able to fantasize, however bizarrely,
about a minority culture, and the Frankfurt School Maf)(ists
pinned their hopes on the avant-gude, Bolludrillard feels so
overwhelmed by the plethora of disconnected images that
chuacterize our time tNot he offers nothing but resignation and
sell-indulgence. Thus, he marh wh.tot seeMS likely to be the Jast
gasp of the high culture critique .tond with it, its demise into utter
futility. In offering no hope for soci.tol intervention,the critique
fin.toUy renders itself incap.toble of offering a response to
contemporollry lile other than .topollthy .tond excess. Indeed, he sees
apathy as the sole remaining means to resist the perpetr.totors of
popul.tor culture (B.toudrillud, 1988, p . 208).
Baudrillud' s original contribution is to proclaim the
dissolution of the distinction between the real and the illusory.
Once, he .torgues, culture reflected a basic reality, then it hid tNot
b.tosic reality, then it hid the absence of reality, but now culture
signifies nothing (1988. p . 1701. All that now exists is
representolltion. One o f his chief arguments is the proliferation of
the popular arts (1986), and their ability to seduce, overwhelm,
intoxicate, and deliver us in to a state of "hyperreali ty." Everyday
life Nos berome aesthetized, enveloped in .ton aesthetics of the
surface where d iscrimi nation has been replaced by revelry.
Baudrillard too seems nostalgic for the past. He rages against
what he considers the passing of meollningful and depthful
experience.
Ba ud.rillud (1986) relentlessly C.Jstigates postmodern times
olInd vilifies the users of contempor.tory mass culture. In The
Ecstllsy 0/ Communication (986), contemporary cul ture is
repea tedl y seen in terms of "pomogr.tophy", "obscenity"', and
"excrement"'. Television is "like a microsco pic pornography of
the universe, useless. excessive, just like the sexual close up in a
porno film" (p. 130). In terms that owe much to Horkheimerand
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masses.,

Adorno, Baudrillard (1983) sees the
blindly consuming
all that is offered ;lind as having nothing to say in response. They
are "spongy"', representing"a social void", in a stateof "inertia",
and like an "opaque nebula whose growing density absorbs all
the surrounding energy and light rays, to collapse finally under
its own weight, a "black hole which engulfs" everything (pp. 14). The bhlck hole absorbs all meaning. information, and
communications and renders it mnningless. The ma55eS refuse
to accept and produce mea.n ing; In the face of constant
bombardment by television, newspapers, cinema, videos,
spectacles and so on, the masses are as indifferent and apathetic

as the cultural materiallhey absorb is meaningless.

115

need to face the present. Arnold (1869/1891) was right in this:
"We need to turn a stream of frf!$h and free thoughl upon our
stock notions and habits" (p. viii).

Free and Fresh Thought
What today would constitute free and fresh thought for art
If high culture represents a dead end, what road are
we 10 tr.avel upon?
~ucation?

I have elsewhere explored the sign posting (or an art
which would offer positive ways 10 engage with our
cultural epoch(Duncum, I990, 1993). Positive engagement means
being viewed by television-wise, computer-literate students as
having something meaningful to say in the world they inhabit.
In place of high cuitu.r e, I offer Ihe semiotic view of culture as
those artifacts and practices through which we make meaning
on an everyday basis.
~ucation

Baudrillard is ostensibly from the left he was originally a
Neo-M alXist but his work readily serves the in te.rests of reaction.
As Harvey (1989) IlgUes, whe.n critique diS50lves into apathy
and ethics dissolve into aesthetics, charismatic politics are
unhindered and fascism is not far from the door. As Sietz (1990)
has asked, '"Is it possible that some clever postmodem expert at
the CIA (or KGB) invented 'Baudrillard' ?". Like Arnold and
leavis, both liberals, whose work was malTed by reaction,
Baudrillard' s critique is easy prey for the forces of repression he
would presumably abhor. Thus does the tradition of high culture
begin with a conservative politics and increasingly move, either
explicitly as with Eliot or by consequence as with Baudrillard,
towa rd fascism .

Summ4lry
Baudril1ard's metaphor of a black hole is more aptly aimed
at the invocation of high culture. For those who would tum to
high culture as a remedy for contemporary social ills, the history
of the high culture critique offers a salutary lesson. To promote
high culture in opposition to democratic impulses and the
plurality of other voices, as a safehaven from an otherwise
unsafe world , is to be marginalized ever more from an
engagement with the cultu ral life of our period. It isa nost;lligic
indu.l gence in an Idnl which on examination melts into air, a
withdrawal into a past which never existed . Not only is the road
behind us blocked, there is nothing to which we can return. We

In my view the road ahead issignposted with propositions
like the following : Different (ultural forms should be seen as
categories nol evaluations. Simple and hierarchical dIstinctions
between high and low culluff must give way to an understanding
that cultural forms serve a multitude of often subtle and complex
functions for differe.nt people in different contexts. A broad,
inclusive definition of the visual arts is necessary. Rather than
confined to the fine arts, visual arts education needs to become
what Pearson (1994) has called an "education in pictures". Instead
of viewing art as socially privileged, we need to view our subject
as the pictures which saturate and inform our students' IiVf!$.
Instead of art being regarded as something special, imagery
should be considered as ordinary as everyday speech. Like
ordinary language, itls through commonplace imagery that the
real battlegrounds for people's hearts and minds are fought.
Instead of viewing cultural forms omnipotently, they need
10 be viewed from an insider's position. If stude.nts are to take
notice of our views and value our knowledge, we must be
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familiar with their own views and their often prodigious, albeit
decontextualised knowledge about imagery.
Rather than culture being imposed from above, culture
should be seen to emerge from and serve people's fundamentill
needs. People should be seen not as passive consumers of culture,
but asilctive disc:ri.m inators. insteild of seeing contemporilry life
as atomised, culturililife should be u.n derstood as profoundly
social, or.s Enzenberger (1974) puts it, " .I social product made
up by people; its origin is the dialogue" (p.5).
In place of seeing contemporary life ilS marking a decline in
sod.l and cultural s tandards, it needs to be ackno wledged thilt
contemporary cultural forms have numerous precedents. There
is nothing new in ce:lebuting the trivial, senSiotionill a nd ilbsurd .
Simililfly, the fine arts hilve no monopoly on the profound.
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged thilt present times
aTe informed by fa r more enlightened views tha n in the put on
a wide ril nge of issues, Including religio us affiliation, race, age,
gender, and sexual preference. Far from representing a decline,
present times present new chilUe.nges. ThHe include new
technologies and pluralist and fragile social fonnations, as well
as enormous concentrAtions of media power . We ilTe challenged
to critically embnce television, video And computer games, for
example, and to be ready for the informa tion highway. We are
challe nged to accommodate numerous competing voices Ii lera IIy
j mages from different groups as they vie for power and infl uenee.
Rather than privileging aesthetic delight, the visual arts need
foremost to be seen AS sights of ideologicAl struggle in which art
eduCiltors have the potential to playa central role.
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1. I do not wish to imply that nowadAyS illi proponents of
DBAE can be seenAS neo-conservatives. Rather, I wish to indicate
that earlie.r fonnulations of DBAE were deeply conservative in
both content and mode of delivery.
2. Other feiltures of the high culture critique which they
each share is an outsider's perspective to the culture they
condemn and their propensity to rely on rhetoric rather than
facts. The highly literate Arnold had assumed that an illiterate
culture was inferior; Adorno, the European, cla ssically trained
music critic, condemned American Jazz (Horkheimer &: Adorno,
1944/1972); and the Frenc h intellectual Bilud rillard (1988)
condemns American cu.l ture in generAl and Disneyland in
particular (pp. 171·172). The English literary critics as much as
the Frankfurt School fililed to define their bilsic terms. Arnold
spoke frequently of "sweetness and light'" as defining terms of
culture but nowhere defines these terms Oohn50n, 1979, p . 33).
Eliot's definitions break down because he is u nwill ing to ilIustra Ie
(Williams, 1958, p. 231) and Leavis and Marcuse both assume the
reader simply undef$tand, wha.t is meant by culture (see Leavis,
1930, p. 5; Marcuse, 1978, p . x). Similarly, BAudrillard's fails to
define major terms, uses hyperbolic and declar.J.tive Iilngul.ge.
and ignores contradictory evidence (Poster, 1988, p . 7)
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